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    <title>DSpace Collection: College of Administrative Sciences and Al-Majma’ah</title>
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    <title>Control, conflict and satisfaction in international channels:  autos in a middle-eastern market</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/7812</link>
    <description>Title: Control, conflict and satisfaction in international channels:  autos in a middle-eastern market&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Al-Motawa, Ahmed A.; Ahmed, Ahmed A.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This is a study of the relationship between foreigncar-manufacturers and their respective agents in the "emerging"market of Saudi Arabia. The study takes the theories and findingsabout the relationship in advanced country domestic situations to seeif they apply to a cross-country situation involving manufacturersfrom advanced countries and agents in a developing country. Thestudy examines the extent of the manufacturer control over the dealer,the sources of that control and how each of these affect the levelof conflict between the manufacturer and the dealer, and the dealersatisfaction, all from the dealer's perspective. Based on the literature,hypotheses were formulated and constructs developed using a questionnaireto which a relatively large sample of the dealers responded.Appropriate statistical tests of reliability and validity were conductedand thereafter simple Pearson correlations were calculated to test thehypotheses. Unlike in most advanced country studies, manufacturerswere found to practice little control over their agents, nor was controlfound to be associated with the use of coercive and non-coercivemeasures by the manufacturers. But other facets of the relationshipwere found to be generally similar to other studies. Conflict wasfound to relate positively to the use of coercive measures by themanufacturer. Dealer satisfaction was found to relate positively tothe use of non-coercive measures and negatively to the level ofconflict and the use of coercive measures.</description>
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    <title>The Concept Public Interest</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/7799</link>
    <description>Title: The Concept Public Interest&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Rasheed, Mazen Faris&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Due to lack of a proper definition of this crucialconcept, Interest groups interpret it to suit theirpurpose and public Administrators are called upon tostrike a balance. The author, therefore, emphasizes theneed for a systematic definition of the concept.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Description: Assistant Professor, Department of Public Administration, College of AdministrativeSciences, King Saud University, P.O. Box 2459, Riyadh 11451, Saudi Arabia</description>
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    <title>An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship between Executive Risk Sharing and Corporate Performance</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/5846</link>
    <description>Title: An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship between Executive Risk Sharing and Corporate Performance&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Al-Heizan, Osama Fahd&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: There is a growing research on the relationship between executivecompensation and firm performance in publicly owned corporations.Much of that research employ the agency theory to explain incentives incompensation contracts and performance (e.g., Indjejikian, 1999;Bushman and Indjejikian, 1993; Lambert and Larcker, 1987). Thecommon proposition underlying this line of research is that in order tomotivate executives to spend effort and work for the best interest of theshareholders, compensation contracts should include some form ofincentive component (Hays and Schaefer, 2000; Indjejikian, 1999; Baberet al., 1999; Sloan, 1993). Such an incentive component should establisha link between executive compensation and the performance of the firmthey manage. Shareholders are mainly interested in the value of the firmand the stock return they receive. Executive compensation can be used asan effective "instrument for creating value for shareholders by (improvingtheir) firm s performance"</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/4132">
    <title>Cointegration, error correction and the demand for money in Saudi Arabia</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/4132</link>
    <description>Title: Cointegration, error correction and the demand for money in Saudi Arabia&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Alkswani, Mamdouh Alkhatib; Al-Towaijari, Hamad A.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This study investigates the determinants of the money demand function inSaudi Arabia. Saudi economy was instable during the period 1977-1997because of its dependence of the production of oil. This depending affectssharply the rates of growth and the rates of inflation. The integration andcointegration proprieties of the data are analyzed and the model of errorcorrection is used to estimate the demand for money. This paper concludes thateven the period of high instability in the economy, there exists a stationaritylong run demand for narrow money (M1) in Saudi Arabia.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Description: Author 1 :Alkswani, Mamdouh AlkhatibAssociate Professor,Author 2: Al-Towaijari, Hamad A.Assistant Professor in Economics Department, College of Administrative Sciences, King Saud University</description>
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